IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION

RONALD D. CIARAVELLA, Plaintiff, VS. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA, and SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision of the State of Florida Defendants.

CASE NO. 99-4201-CA Division: C

THIS CAUSE having come before this Court pursuant to Plaintiff s Motion for Final Summary Judgment and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court having reviewed said Motions, and having heard argument of counsel, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. Defendant, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SARASOTA COUNTY, (hereinafter referred to as "Board's is the governing body of unincorporated Sarasota County with the authority to adopt such ordinances as may be necessary to carry out both County and municipal powers and purposes,

2. Defendant, SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA, (hereinafter referred to as "County") is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and a Charter County pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1(c) of the Florida Constitution.

3. On -or about November 6, 1990, the electors of Sarasota County approved an amendment to the Sarasota County Charter ("Charter") designated as Section 5.5 (renumbered as Section 6.5), which related to campaign financing.

4. Section 6.5 of the Charter established limits on the amount of contributions candidates may accept, and provided that the Board of County Commissioners shall adopt rules for the enforcement of such limits.

5. On or about July 29, 1991, pursuant to the direction of the aforementioned Charter provisions, the Board adopted Sarasota County Ordinance 91-048.

6. Section 4.1 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.SA of the Sarasota County Charter provide as follows:

   "No candidate for any county office for which compensation is paid shall accept any contribution from any contributor, in cash or in kind, in an amount in excess of $200.00"

7. Section 4,2 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.SC of the Sarasota County Charter provide as follows:

   "No candidate for any county office for which compensation is paid shall accept contributions from all sources, in cash or in hind, in an amount in excess of $40,000.00"

8. Section 4.3 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.5E of the Sarasota County Charter provide as follows:

   "No candidate who stands for election for any unpaid county office may accept donations from all sources, in cash or in kind, in an amount in excess of $2,000.00"

9. Section 5 of Ordinance 91-048 provides as follows:

   "For purposes of applying the contribution limitations imposed by this ordinance all primary and general elections conducted to fill a particular county office shall be treated as one period of candidacy."

10. Section 6.1 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.SB of the Sarasota County Charter provide as follows:

    "No political committee supporting the candidacy of any person standing for election for any Sarasota County office shall accept from any contributor, in cash or in kind, an amount in excess of $100.00."

11. Section 6.2 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.SD of the Sarasota County Charter provide as follows:

    "No political committee making contributions to any candidate for any Sarasota County office may accept contributions from all sources, in cash or in kind, in an amount in excess of $1,000.00 per candidate.

    
    
    
    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    
    
    

    Federal Constitutional Law Applicable to Limits on Campaign Contributions:

12. Each person's right of free speech and freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See, Bucklev v. Valeo, 424 US. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976). The protection of the First Amendment is made applicable to each state by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

13. The regulation of campaign financing has been held to infringe upon the free exercise of free speech and freedom of association. However, the regulation of campaign financing is allowable in limited instances, if the regulation can be supported by a sufficient governmental interest and narrowly drawn to achieve the interest in the least intrusive manner Let's Help Florida v. McCray, Jr., 621 F. 2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980). As explained in Let's Help Florida, "The governmental interest in restricting contributions to candidates is substantial because actual corruption resulting from a candidate's dependence upon large individual contributors would undermine the integrity of representative democracy, and even the appearance of corruption that arises from public awareness of the possibilities for abuse would erode confidence in the democratic system.

14. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication. Buckley.

15. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization involves little direct restraint on political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution, but does not in any way infringe upon the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. Further, the limitation furthers the compelling government interest of prevention of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates. Buckley.

16. Section 4.1 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.5A of the Sarasota County Chatter regarding limitations on the amount any candidate may accept from any one contributor, is not an unconstitutional abridgment of an individual's freedom of speech or freedom of association.

17. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that a limitation on the aggregate amount that a candidate may accept is not constitutional. Such a limitation imposes far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association than does a ceiling on an individual contribution. The government interest advanced in support of a limitation on the aggregate amount a candidate may accept, must satisfy exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression, The governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify an aggregate ceiling on the amount of campaign contributions that a candidate may accept. As explained by the U. S, Supreme Court, given the important role of contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing from a large number of sources the resources necessary for effective advocacy. Buckley

    Additionally, an aggregate ceiling would only allow a finite number of individuals to contribute to a campaign until the ceiling was reached. A ceiling would preclude others from exercising their constitutional right to show support for a candidate by contributing.

18. The Defendants admirably concede that Section 4.2 of Ordinance 91048/Section 6.SC of the Sarasota County Charter and Section 4.3 of Ordinance 91048/Section 6.5E of the Sarasota County Charter regarding an aggregate ceiling on campaign contributions, are unconstitutional based upon the reasoning set forth in Buckley.

    Preemption:

19. If allowable pursuant to Federal Law, a local government may legislate in a certain area as long as that particular subject area has not been preempted by State law.

20. In the arena of limits on campaign contributions, the State of Florida has enacted Chapter 106, Fla. Stat., entitled "campaign financing."

21. There are two means by which preemption may occur, express or implied.

    Express preemption requires that a statute contain specific language of preemption directed to a particular subject at issue Santa Rosa County v. GulfPower Company, 635 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). There is no language contained within Chapter 106, Fla. Stat., which expressly preempts the local government from legislating in the arena of campaign contribution limitations.

22. Implied preemption exists in cases in which the legislative scheme is so pervasive as to evidence intent to preempt the particular area, and in which strong public policy reasons exist for finding an area to be preempted by the legislature Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center. Inc. v. Tallahassee Medical Center, Inc., 681 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA I996), Implied preemption occurs if a legislative scheme is so pervasive that it occupies the entire field, creating a danger of conflict between local and state laws Santa Rosa.

23. Chapter 106, Fla. Stat, does not impliedly preempt local governments from legislating in the arena of campaign contribution limitations. The state regulatory scheme is not so pervasive that the County has no room to act.

    Conflict:

24. Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law or with special law approved by vote of the electors. The governing body of a county operating under a chatter may enact county ordinances not inconsistent with general law (See Article VIII, Section I (g) of the Florida Constitution).

25. The Defendants admirably concede that Section five (S) of Ordinance 91048 regarding the definition of "election," is inconsistent with the definition provided in Section 106.011(6), Fla. Stat., and therefore unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution.

26. The Defendants admirably concede that Section 2.3 of Ordinance 91-043 regarding the definition of "political committee," is inconsistent with the definition provided in Section 106,011(1), Fla. Stat., and therefore unconstitutional under the v Florida Constitution.

27. Section 6.SB and 6.SD of the Charter utilize the definition of "political committee" as set out in Section 2.3 of Ordinance 91-048, and are therefore unenforceable.

28. Even using the definition of "political committee" as set out in Section 106.011(1), Fla. Stat., Section 6.SB and 6.SD are unenforceable as the subject provisions are vague and overreaching.

29. Section 4.1 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.SA of the Sarasota County Charter state:

    "No candidate ... shall accept any contribution from any contributor, in cash or in kind, in an amount in excess of $200.00."

30. The relevant portion of Section 1 08, Fla. Stat, provides:

    " ....no person... may, in any election, make contributions in excess of $500.00 to any candidate..."

31. Section 4.1 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.SA of the Sarasota County Charter are not inconsistent or in conflict with Section 106.08, Fla. Stat.

32. Statutes and ordinances are to be reconciled where possible and effect given to both. So long as a statute and ordinance on the same subject do not conflict, they both will stand or supplement each other Boven v. City of St- Petersbu~, 73 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1954).

33. The word "conflict" and the word "inconsistent" (as used in Article VIII, Section 6(f) of the Florida Constitution) mean contradictory in the sense of legislative provisions which cannot co-exist E.B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F. 2d 1141, 1150. ( 5^th Circuit 1970).

34. State and local provisions can co-exist as. long as the local regulation does not require an individual to take any action which would violate the state law or forbid the individual from taking action which the state law requires See. Pace v. Board of Adjustment, 492 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 198b).

35. A local regulation and state statute are in "conflict" if, in order to comply with one, a violation of the other is required. The question is, does compliance with the ordinance in question violate the state law, or make compliance with state law impossible? The answer is "no." it is not a conflict if the ordinance is more stringent than the statute. F.Y I. Adventures. Inc. v. City of Ocala, 698 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).

36. Although Section 4.1 of Ordinance 9I-048 and Section 6,SA of the Sarasota County Charter are more stringent than Section 106.08, Fla. Stet., compliance with the local regulation does not require violation of the state law or forbid one from taking any action which the state law requires. The local regulation and state statute can co-exist.

Based on the foregoing, this Court holds as follows:

1. Section 4.2 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.SC of the Sarasota County Charter are unconstitutional and unenforceable.

2. Section 4.3 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6,5E of the Sarasota County Charter are unconstitutional and unenforceable.

3. Section 5 of Ordinance 91-048 is unconstitutional and unenforceable.

4. Section 2.3 of Ordinance 9I-Oa8 and Section 6.5 of the Sarasota County Charter relating to the definition of "political committee" are unconstitutional and unenforceable. As a result, Section 6.1 and 6.2 of Ordinance 91-048 together with Sections 6.5B and 6.5D of the Sarasota County Charter are unenforceable.

5. Section 4.1 of Ordinance 91-048 and Section 6.SA of the Charter are constitutional and enforceable.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Sarasota County, Florida this 10th day of September, 1999.

BOB McDONALD, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Barbara B. Levin, Esq.
David P. Persson, Esq.
Andrew H. Cohen, Esq.